The main thesis of this excellent little book is that "contrary to widespread misapprehensions, two formally different kinds of utilitarianism, simple and general, and along with the latter one kind of rule-utilitarianism, are extensionally equivalent; that is, analogous principles of the various kinds necessarily yield equivalent judgments in all cases; or, in other words, it makes no difference in theory whether the simple or generalization test is applied to acts or—within limits—whether an appeal is made to rules grounded in utility." (...) The "misapprehension" is dispelled in the particularly valuable third chapter, "Extensional Equivalence," by means of an a priori causal analysis of action situations and an exacting consideration of action descriptions. Furthermore, Lyons argues that other rule-utilitarian theories not extensionally equivalent to the simple utilitarianism of tradition differ from it in the wrong ways. As a result of these two findings the author holds that "any appeal to generalization or to rules consequently fails to escape the force of traditional arguments against utilitarianism." Utilitarian readers who accept Lyons' argument and particularly his interspersed but incisive criticisms of the works of Broad, Harrison, Singer, Harrod, Brandt, and Rawls, are likely to feel that it is best to go back to Mill! But in his final chapter Lyons' analysis of promising and fairness throws doubt on the adequacy of any purely utilitarian moral theory. However this may be, to read Lyons' book is to follow a precise and rigorous intellect, free of current dogmas about value statements, while it threads its way through a maze of conceptual complexities toward substantive philosophic conclusions.—R. B. C. (shrink)

The eight essays assembled under this title were originally presented at the 1965 Great Thinkers Forum sponsored by the Department of Philosophy and Religion at the University of Georgia. These essays are now being published in the conviction that they all make "valuable contributions toward the understanding and resolution of the contemporary challenge to theology and religion." The challenge in question is the one that comes from neopositivism and linguistic analysis. By the time the reader comes to the end of (...) his own effort he finds himself wondering in what sense the 1965 papers are to count as valuable contributions. No doubt they are valuable in the sense that it is worthwhile watching a single-minded philosopher pouring his soul out in an attempt at showing how the "disguised nonsense" of religious language is "patent nonsense," or how the "putatively factual assertions" of religious language are "bogus, pseudo-factual statements, devoid of the kind of intelligibility that believers rightly demand of them." Along the way one may collect pearls of rare beauty, such as the statement that "There is no convention in English or logical rule which makes ‘there is no God’ a contradiction," or questions such as "Who has observed him under controlled conditions?" Another contribution of the same general usefulness may well be that the thoughtful reader is being initiated to the exertions of that transformational hermeneutics by which pseudo-assertive religious statements are being rescued from wholesale meaninglessness, and accorded the innocuous meaningfulness of emotive or convictional language, or of disguised moral discourse. Professor Frank H. Harrison III makes an interesting attempt at injecting into the landscape, linguistically and epistemologically so bleak, what he calls "knowledge by acquaintance," which is in his vocabulary the equivalent of what mysticism calls amor Dei, and Antoine de Saint-Exupéry describes as a seeing with the heart. The discussion of myth by Professor Robert H. Ayers ignores what happens to be the heart of the matter in mythic thinking, namely the absence of the distinction between object and subject, but does provide a good introduction to the "profusion of confusion" that flourishes around myth, "one of the most traveled hobos in our times.". (shrink)

OBJECTIVES: To study the opinions of nationals (Emiratis) and doctors practising in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) with regard to informing terminally ill patients. DESIGN: Structured questionnaires administered during January 1995. SETTING: The UAE, a federation of small, rich, developing Arabian Gulf states. PARTICIPANTS: Convenience samples of 100 Emiratis (minimum age 15 years) and of 50 doctors practising in government hospitals and clinics. RESULTS: Doctors emerged as consistently less in favour of informing than the Emiratis were, whether the patient was (...) described as almost certain to die during the next six months or as having a 50% chance of surviving, and even when it was specified that the patient was requesting information. In the latter situation, a third of doctors maintained that the patient should not be told. Increasing survival odds reduced the number of doctors selecting to inform; but it had no significant impact on Emiratis' choices. When Emiratis were asked whether they would personally want to be informed if they had only a short time to live, less than half responded in the way they had done to the in principle question. CONCLUSIONS: The doctors' responses are of concern because of the lack of reference to ethical principles or dilemmas, the disregard of patients' wishes and dependency on survival odds. The heterogeneity of Emiratis' responses calls into question the usefulness of invoking norms to explain inter-society differences. In the current study, people's in principle choices did not provide a useful guide to how they said they would personally wish to be treated. (shrink)

This paper argues that professionals who make boundary-related decisions should be guided by relationship-based practice. In our roles as service users and professionals, drawing from our lived experiences of professional relationships, we argue we need to move away from distance-based practice. This includes understanding the boundary stories and narratives that exist for all of us – including the people we support, other professionals, as well as the organisations and systems within which we work. When we are dealing with professional boundary (...) issues, we should centre relationship-building skills that are central to many other aspects of our work. Skills that foster relationships at all levels – between professionals, service users, and services – need to be revalued. Our final recommendation is to create, develop, and foster safer spaces within and outside of organisations, as well as inter-professionally, for the discussion and exploration of boundary-related issues and practice. We are interested in hearing from those with experiences of being marginalised by boundaries so that they can inform a reshaping of our collective ideas around boundary related practices. To foster relationship-based practices in organisations, we have outlined several recommendations here; however, we recognize that these do not go far enough, and that collective action is needed to inform systemic change. (shrink)

This book is not a study of Plato's philosophy, but a contribution to the literary interpretation of the dialogues, through analysis of their formal structure, ...

A comprehensive reference work for everyone concerned with the complicated moral issues of this world, this unique volume clearly communicates what Scripture teaches about the ethical dilemmas facing our society. Biological warfare, corporate responsibility, human rights, computer ethics, and much more are discussed by over fifty scholars who explain the moral guidelines in the Bible and historic Christian teachings. R.K. Harrison, author and editor of over thirty books on biblical studies, has brought together a valuable A to B treasury (...) of thought for every believer searching for guidance. (shrink)

This collection demonstrates the strong influence that humanism and freethought had in developing the history and ideals of black intellectualism. Most people are quick to note the profound influence that religion has played in African-American history: consoling the downtrodden slave or inspiring the abolitionists, the underground railroad, and the civil rights movement. But few are aware of the role humanism played in shaping the black experience: developing the thought and motivating the actions of powerful African-American intellectuals. Section One of this (...) book offers biographical sketches of such prominent black humanists as Frederick Douglass, Cheikh Anta Diop, W.E.B. DuBois, Hubert H. Harrison, and Richard Wright. Section Two features essays by black humanists: Douglass, DuBois, Charles W. Faulkner, Langston Hughes, Zora Neale Hurston, Ishmael Jaffree, Claude McKay, Melvin B. Tolson, and Bruce Wright. Section Three offers the views of contemporary black African humanists: Freda Amakye Ansah, Emmanuel Kofi Mensah, Nkeonye Otakpor, Franz Vanderpuye, and Kwasi Wiredu. Section Four contains interviews conducted by Allen on the subjects of black humanist activism, the Afroasiatic roots of classical civilization, and the Harlem Renaissance with: Martin G. Bernal, Charles Faulkner, Leonard Harris, Norman Hill, and Alaine Locke. (shrink)

Despite All Critique (2014) -- World Politics and Western Reason (1980) -- The Doubled Outsides of the Modern International (2005) -- The Subject of Security (1995) -- The Protection of Nature and the Nature of Protection (2005) -- Social Movements/World Politics (1994) -- Europe is Not Where It is Supposed to Be (2000) -- They Seek it Here, They Seek it There : Looking for Politics in Clayoquot Sound (2003) -- Violence, Modernity, Silence : From Weber to International Relations (1993) (...) -- Hobbes, Origins, Limits (2011) -- War, Terror, Judgement (2002) -- International, Imperial, Exceptional (2005) -- Which Democracy for Which Demos? (2013) -- The Political Theory of Boundaries and the Boundaries of Political Theory : Interview With Raia Prokhovnik (2012). (shrink)

In this paper a formalized logic of propositions, PA1, is presented. It is proven consistent and its relationships to traditional logic, to PM ([15]), to subjunctive (including contrary-to-fact) implication and to the “paradoxes” of material and strict implication are developed. Apart from any intrinsic merit it possesses, its chief significance lies in demonstrating the feasibility of a general logic containing theprinciple of subjunctive contrariety, i.e., the principle that ‘Ifpwere true thenqwould be true’ and ‘Ifpwere true thenqwould be false’ are incompatible.

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It is a common complaint against moral philosophers that their abstract theorising bears little relation to the practical problems of everyday life. Professor Braithwaite believes that this criticism need not be inevitable. With the help of the Theory of Games he shows how arbitration is possible between two neighbours, a jazz trumpeter and a classical pianist, whose performances are a source of mutual discord. The solution of the problem in the lecture is geometrical, and is based on the formal analogy (...) between the logic of the situation and the geometry of a parabola. But an appendix provides the alternative algebraic treatment of a general two-person collaboration situation. (shrink)

To controlforceaccurately under a wide range of behavioral conditions, the central nervous system would either require a detailed, continuously updated representation of the state of each muscle (and the load against which each is acting) or else force feedback with sufficient gain to cope with variations in the properties of the muscles and loads. The evidence for force feedback with adequate gain or for an appropriate central representation is not sufficient to conclude that force is the major controlled variable in (...) normal limb movements.Morton's hypothesis, thatlengthis controlled by a follow-up servo, has a number of difficulties related to the delays, gains, variability, and specificity in feedback pathways comprising potential servo loops. However, experimental evidence is consistent with these pathways providing servo assistance for some movements produced by coactivation of α- and static γ-motoneurons. Dynamic γ-motoneurons may provide an additional input for adaptive control of different types of movements.The idea that feedback is used to compensate for changes in musclestiffnesshas received experimental support under static postural conditions. However, reflexes tend to increase rather than decrease the range of variation in muscle stiffness during some cyclic movements. Theoretical problems associated with the regulation of stiffness are also discussed. The possibilities of separate control systems forvelocityorviscosityare considered, but the evidence is either negative or lacking. I conclude that different physical variables can be controlled depending on the type of limb movement required. The concept of stiffness regulation is also useful under some conditions, but should probably be extended to the regulation of the visco-elastic properties (i.e., the mechanical impedance) of a muscle or joint. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and (...) made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

This volume is a collection of original essays by eminent philosophers written for R. B. Braithwaite's eightieth birthday to celebrate his work and teaching. In one way or another, all the essays reflect his central concern with the impact of science on our beliefs about the world and the responses appropriate to that. Together they testify to the signal importance of his contributions in areas of philosophy bearing on this concern: the philosophy of science, especially of the statistical sciences, theories (...) of belief and of probability, decision theory and games theory. This book, which includes a full bibliography of Professor Braithwaite's work, will interest advanced students and professionals in the fields of philosophy and psychology. (shrink)

One area in which the moral philosopher might say something useful for the thinking of economists is that of welfare economics – not by improving formalizations or criticizing proofs as to conditions necessary or sufficient for an optimum situation, much less by suggesting what particular state of society would be optimal. Rather, he can do this by pointing out some distinctions, by suggesting how some terms used by economists can profitably be defined, and by questioning some assumptions which seem to (...) lie behind the thinking of some economists. The following discussion is aimed along these lines. The main goal of the argument will be to produce helpful definitions of “increase the welfare of an individual” and “increase social welfare.”. (shrink)

Virtually all philosophers now agree that human beings - and possibly the higher animals - have moral rights in some sense, both special rights against individuals to whom they stand in a special relation, and general rights, against everybody or against the government, just in virtue of their human nature. Some philosophers also think, however, that anyone who is a utilitarian ought not to share this view: there is a fundamental incompatibility between utilitarinism and human rights. Most utilitarians, of course, (...) have not thought there is such an incompatibility. John Stuart Mill, for instance, espoused utilitarianism at the same time that he defended rights to free speech and freedom of action except where it injures others. In what follows I wish to explore some reasons recently put forward to show that the utilitarian who wishes to affirm that there are moral rights faces a serious logical problem; and I shall argue that further analysis shows the alleged difficulty is unreal. (shrink)

Many social scientists and philosophers have counted themselves moral relativists in some sense or other. We cannot deal with all the various views which are properly called forms of “moral relativism”; so I propose to explain a form of moral relativism which seems to me an interesting, and somewhat plausible theory. This theory comprises the following three affirmations: The basic moral principles of different individuals or groups sometimes are, or can be, in some important sense conflicting. When there is such (...) fundamental conflict of basic principles or standards, there is either always, or at least sometimes, no way to show that one view is better justified even in the presence of ideally complete factual information; in that sense the principles are equally justified or “valid.” But there is a sense in which a particular moral belief may be mistaken or unjustified, if it is a misapplication of the basic principles of the individual or group, e.g., if the basic principles plus statements of known or knowable facts entail a moral proposition incompatible with it. As stated, moral relativism could be true even though in fact, accidentally, all individuals agree in their basic moral principles. (shrink)

Anyone, today, with even a slight interest in the methodology of science will be aware of the heated debate which has raged in regard to the thesis of the logical symmetry between explanation and prediction, which is entailed by the hypotheticodeductive account of scientific theory. The symmetry thesis, which received its classical exposition in a well-known article by Hempel and Oppenheim [2], has been subject to a steadily growing criticism by several eminent thinkers. My intention, in this article, is to (...) argue that the current reaction to the Hempel-Oppenheim position, as exemplified by Professors Hanson, Scriven, et al., represents a retrograde movement in the philosophy of science, which, as the number of its converts grows, could undermine the progress, which has been accomplished in the broad tradition that extends from Mach and Poincaré through the Vienna Circle to the present day. Specifically, it is my contention that the aforementioned reaction is symptomatic of a contemporary trend in the direction of irrationalism which, of all branches of philosophy, the philosophy of science should seek to dispel rather than to foster. For the sake of brevity, I propose to focus my remarks wholly on the original widely read article of Hanson on this subject [1]. That I single out this particular source should not be taken to belie the admiration I hold for the masterful scholarship of its author. (shrink)